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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, the strengthening in Turkish constitutional 
culture of the rule of law and pluralism appeared as a further 
breach of the Kemalist ideology of “sacralization” of the State. 
Nevertheless, the principle of statehood, characterizing the 
Republic of Turkey since its creation in 1923 and now affirmed in 
art. 1 of the Constitution still influences Turkish institutions. With 
regard to judicial system, while Euro-driven reforms and the 
application of the conditionality principle led to its modernization, 
the Constitution sketches an organization based on both 
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institutional dependence and corporatism. These features are 
reflected also in judicial education, notwithstanding the 
establishment of a judicial academy in 2003 and the reform of 
training catalogues. 
Referring to legal and political science literature, as well as 
to documents and reports of the Council of Europe and of the 
European Union, this paper examines through the lens of training 
policies the evolution of Turkish judicial culture in relation to 
independence and pluralism, sketching a first hypothesis on the 
effectiveness of judicial training reforms in the perspective of 
European enlargement. Taking into account three typical elements 
of any judicial training system—institutions, contents and 
methods—it highlights the difficulties encountered in reforming 
judicial training. In particular, it argues that the resistance to open 
up the judicial elite to social pluralism in order to allow the 
judiciary to act as an interface with civil society is due to the 
peculiarities of the Turkish socio-political system (i.e. a non-
homogeneous society and the need of “lay” guardians of the 
Republic). As a consequence, European influence is still limited to 
the introduction of specific training catalogues, such as human 
rights and EU law, but (still) do not really affect the institutional 
framework, nor adapts judicial training contents and methods to 
social and political pluralism. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper focuses on the changes in the Turkish judicial 
training system in the context of the European convergence, which 
has also involved other major legal reforms or projects such as the 
harmonization packages adopted between 2002 and 2004 and the 
Judicial Reform Strategy Action Plan launched by the Turkish 
Government in 2009. The recent evolution of Turkish judicial 
training is strictly related to the Europeanization of the national 
legal system since the Helsinki European Council held in 
December 1999, recognizing Turkey as an EU candidate country. 
Thus, a joint programme between the Council of Europe and the 
European Union on “Modernization of the Judiciary and Penal 
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Reform” has been implemented from 2004 to 2007.1 Among its 
specific objectives, the programme included the “Training of 
judicial staff strengthened according to European standards and 
practices.” Furthermore, Turkish judges and prosecutors 
participated in specific programmes aimed at providing training in 
sensitive areas. In this paper, I investigate the relation between 
changes in judicial training and the judicial culture,2 arguing that 
the Turkish-European convergence in the field of judicial training 
is generating changes in specific areas of legal knowledge and 
allowing a transnational diffusion of rules, but does not deeply 
affect the judicial mentality nor involve the contaminations of 
judicial cultures. 
For this purpose, I will briefly outline some distinctive 
features of the Turkish judiciary, and then analyze closer the 
judicial training system. As a preliminary remark, it is necessary to 
stress that I limit my discussion to the ordinary courts and judges, 
without considering administrative courts, military courts and the 
Constitutional Court. However, these different judicial branches 
are partly interconnected and are characterized by a partially 
common training. 
 
II. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE TURKISH JUDICIARY 
 
The Turkish constitutional system is founded on Kemalism, 
as ideology marked by the unity of the State. As a consequence, 
Turkish constitutionalism is rooted in the (partial) opposition 
between government (hükümet) and State (devlet), that is between 
institutions endowed with representative legitimization—Grand 
National Assembly in primis—and State structures and elites—
                                                                                                             
 1. ALFRED E. KELLERMANN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF EU ACCESSION ON THE 
LEGAL ORDERS OF NEW EU MEMBER STATES AND (PRE-)CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES: HOPES AND FEARS 215 (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006). 
2. Judicial culture is intended here as legal and political culture of judges 
and prosecutors. I refer to the definition given by Tamara Capeta of legal culture 
as “the prevailing opinion in a society on the purpose of the law and the role of 
different institutions within the legal order” in relation to judges and 
prosecutors. Tamara Capeta, Courts and Legal Culture and EU Enlargement, 1 
CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. AND POL’Y 10 (University of Zagreb, 2005). Political 
culture is the general political principles to which judges refer as well as the 
opinion on the relations between political institutions. 
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among which the judicial body and mainly its hierarchy have a 
relevant place—led by the military and playing the role of 
“guardians” of the Republic. Three distinctive features of the 
Turkish judiciary are strictly connected with the inclusion of the 
judiciary among the State elites. The first is the centrality of the 
judiciary within the legal and the constitutional system (i). The 
second is its political insulation and corporatism (ii). The third, 
which has a substantive character, pertains to the specific legal and 
political cultures marking the judiciary (iii). On the basis of these 
three features, the Turkish politico-legal system outlines a “strong” 
and highly hierarchical judiciary, as a result of an historical 
hybridism blending a traditionally relevant judicial role in the legal 
and the constitutional system and a French-derived judicial 
organization, characterized by hierarchy and corporatism. In this 
framework, “statist” ideology is a crucial factor in shaping the 
Turkish judiciary. 
 
A. Centrality of the Judiciary 
 
The importance of the Turkish judiciary, which is the result 
of a gradual evolution and, in a measure, of a certain “casualness” 
on which any legal system is often grounded, can be pointed out 
from different perspectives. With regard to the legal tradition, the 
Turkish legal system stems from Western continental legal systems 
founded on the predominance of statutory law and codification, 
since the adoption of the Swiss civil code and the Italian criminal 
code, while in the administrative field the French influence has 
prevailed;3 in this context, the hierarchy of the sources of law lies 
in the civil law tradition. However, the Turkish civil code includes 
an “important revolutionary principle,” drawn from the Swiss civil 
code, which expressly authorizes the judge to act as a law-maker 
when any interpretative method is ineffective.4 On this basis, 
Turkish judges expressed a certain judicial activism, complying 
with the model of the “interstitial legislator,” where judicial 
                                                                                                             
 3. TUGRUL ANSAY & DON WALLACE, INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 9 
(5th ed., Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2005). 
 4. Id. 
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activity does not differ qualitatively from that of the legislator.5 
Secondly, the Turkish legal system accepts exceptionally the 
principle of stare decisis, binding lower courts as well as each 
single division of the Supreme Court of Appeals, whereas the 
decision is taken by the General Assembly of the Court.6 
From a constitutional point of view, the centrality of the 
judiciary is rooted in the Constitution of 1961 and then renewed to 
some extent by the Constitution of 1982. While the first establishes 
the principle of the rule of law, formally considering the judiciary 
as a guardian of the Republic, the second assigns the judiciary an 
active role, aimed at regulating “the political arena and [at] 
facilitat[ing] the transformation of the society through state 
action.”7 This particular position of the judiciary, which is typical 
in authoritarian military regimes,8 can be also explained through 
the will of “political elites whose hegemonic interests are 
threatened by popular politicians to delegate some of their power 
to constitutionally empowered judicial institutions in order to 
preserve their privileges.”9 However, since 1982, this position is 
closely linked with the will of the military elite to carry out a 
programme of transformation of society, and the proper role of the 
judiciary is “not to oppose the executive but to support it in the 
performance of its constitutional duties.”10 
 
                                                                                                             
 5. JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 17 (Oxford 
University Press, 1983). Meaningfully, the Constitution of 1961, which 
introduces the incidental review, also allows the courts to directly interpret the 
Constitution in the absence of a decision of the Constitutional court within three 
months from its submission, CONSTITUTION OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC Art. 151. 
The 1982 Constitution bans this practice, establishing that the lower courts have 
to decide in conformity with the existing interpretation. 
 6. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 7. Hootan Shambayati & Esen Kirdis, In Pursuit of “Contemporary 
Civilization:” Judicial Empowerment in Turkey, 62 POL. RES. Q. 767 (2009). A 
different spirit animates art. 8 of the Constitution of 1924: “The judicial power is 
exercised in the name of the Assembly by independent tribunals constituted in 
accordance with the law.” Edward M. Earle, The New Constitution of Turkey, 40 
POL. SCI. Q. 73-100 (1925). 
 8. See RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
 9. G. M. Teczür, Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case, 2 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 245, 309 (2009). 
 10. Shambayati & Kirdiş, supra note 7, at 775.  
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B. Political Insulation, Corporatism, Hierarchy 
 
At this stage the issue of the specific legal and political 
culture of Turkish judges arises. However, I want first to briefly 
point out the second distinctive feature—or bulk of features—
consisting of the political insulation, corporatism and 
“hierarchization” of the judiciary. Indeed, insulation and 
corporatism are the core of the notion of the independence of 
courts in Turkish constitutionalism. 
Insulation is first of all declined in terms of neutralization 
of the judicial function, which permeates several constitutional 
provisions: as examples, I can recall the prohibition for judges and 
prosecutors of becoming members of political parties (art. 68, fifth 
paragraph); the conformity of the judicial activity to the 
Constitution and the law (art. 138, first paragraph); the prohibition 
of any direct or indirect influence on the exercise of the judicial 
function (art. 138, second and third paragraphs); the possibility of 
conducting all or part of the hearings in closed session “in cases 
where absolutely required for reasons of public morality or public 
security” (art. 141, first paragraph); and the election of the 
members of the Supreme Court of Appeals by secret ballot (art. 
154, second paragraph).11 On the other hand, corporatism and 
“hierarchization” shape the institutional organization and the status 
of judges and prosecutors, which is built on the French-derived 
bureaucratic organization.12 
The connection with the extrajudicial—political—sphere is 
realized through the President of the Republic and the Ministry of 
Justice, while the recently adopted constitutional reform of the 
Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which 
encountered the opposition of the higher judges, has broadened the 
links with external institutions. Therefore, the former appoints the 
                                                                                                             
 11. Meaningfully, the Turkish legal system does not envisage the jury, as a 
means to “introduce” society within the judicial system, and has excluded until 
recent times the possibility for judges and prosecutors to create judicial 
associations. 
 12. CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI., THE POWER OF JUDGES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY (Cheryl A. Thomas ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2002). The Turkish judicial organization is based on 
four different ranks, while the career processes are broadly determined by 
magistrates’ superiors. 
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Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor 
among the members of the Supreme Court of Appeals (art. 154, 
first paragraph);13 the Ministry of Justice, to which judges and 
public prosecutors are attached “where their administrative 
functions are concerned” (art. 140, sixth paragraph), authorizes 
inquiries and investigations by judiciary inspectors or senior judges 
or prosecutors (art. 144) and presides over the Supreme Council of 
Judges and Prosecutors (art. 159, second paragraph).14 
 
C. Judicial Culture 
 
The third feature is the legal and political cultures of 
Turkish judges, bringing up three points. The first relates to the 
guardianship role carried on by the judiciary as a part of a group of 
elites15 and to the above-mentioned importance of the judiciary 
within the Constitution of 1961 and 1982. These characteristics are 
linked to the safeguard (either active or passive) of the integrity of 
the Kemalist Republic against any religious, ethnic or social 
enemy. In this regard, it is common to speak in terms of “strategic 
alliance between the judiciary and the military,”16 while some 
authors consider that “the case of Turkey offers a fascinating study 
of a judiciary used in the service of the executive [military] 
branch.”17 The existence of a so-called Republican Alliance 
including—besides the military and the judiciary—other sectors of 
the society and the State such as the Universities and the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) is generally accepted,18 even 
though this picture is not completely sharp, as there have been 
                                                                                                             
 13. Before the above-mentioned reform, the President of the Republic also 
appointed the five members of the HSYK, on the basis of lists established by the 
Supreme Court of Appeals and the Council of State. 
 14. Other non-constitutional provisions give the Ministry of Justice an 
important influence on the judiciary. As an example, a ministerial commission 
controls the admission to the Justice Academy through an oral exam. 
 15. This principle “entails that a group of elites governs by reason of its 
unique knowledge, wisdom, and virtue.” Teczür, supra note 9, at 307. 
 16. Id. at 309. 
 17. Lisa Hiblink & Patricia J. Woods, Comparative Sources of Judicial 
Empowerment, 62 POL. RES. Q. 745, 748 (2009).   
 18. Ceren Belge, Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and 
Selective Activism of the Constitutional Court of Turkey, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
653, 691 (2006). 
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divergences to some extent between the military and the judiciary 
during the 1960’s and 70’s.19 
The second point is the specific “statist” ideology of the 
judiciary, as can be inferred both from the jurisprudence of the last 
decade in some sensitive areas, such as freedom of expression and 
freedom of association or in cases involving members of the 
military, and from the surveys conducted on judicial culture.20 
Case law analysis and studies on judicial culture show that judicial 
ideology is grounded on the defense of state interests (secularism, 
integrity of the state, etc.), rather than on the inclusion of social 
and political pluralism. Actually, a certain opening-up can be 
found in courts’ decisions relating to human rights, showing a 
fracture between sections of the lower judiciary and the high 
judiciary.21 In this regard, the Şemdinli case is exemplar.22 
Nevertheless, this opening-up does not change the general 
tendencies,23 and it has been further observed that “the nature of 
                                                                                                             
 19. Shambayati & Kirdis, supra note 7, at 773. 
 20. Daniella Kuzmanovic, Finally Insights into the Judicial Culture in 
Turkey, available at http://cuminet.blogs.ku.dk (Last visited October 24, 2011) 
(referring to two in-depth studies published in May 2009 by the Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)). 
 21. Tezcür holds that:  
this [jurisprudence] is rather a collective expression of 
professional commitments and ethics of the judges and 
prosecutors. Since the 1980s, the state security forces executed 
people under the pretext of war on terror and were acquitted in 
the courts. This generated a trauma within the judiciary. Now 
the judges are claiming, ‘Do not execute people on behalf of 
the state and demand our complicity. This time, we will not 
comply.’ 
Tezcür, supra note 9, at 328.   
 22. I refer to the bombing of a Kurdish bookshop in November 2005 by 
noncommissioned officers of the army and an ex-PKK militant working for the 
army, who were carrying out one of their ‘‘routine’’ counterinsurgency 
operations. The accused were convicted by the Criminal Court of Van, but the 
Supreme Court of Appeals revoked the verdict and transferred the case to a 
military court. Id. at 318. 
 23. In 2005, the European Commission observed:  
There are signs that the judiciary is increasingly integrating 
the new provisions. Several court judgments have been issued 
suggesting a positive development in areas such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of religion, and the fight against torture 
and ill-treatment and honour crimes. This trend also applies to 
the decisions of the Council of State. On the other hand, courts 
have issued judgments in the opposite direction in the area of 
freedom of expression, including against journalists.  
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the alliance between the TSK [Army] and the higher courts became 
more pronounced after the Justice and Development Party . . . 
came to power in 2002.”24 
Thirdly, consistently with the adherence of Turkish judge 
to the model of the interstitial legislator, judicial discretion tends to 
be very broad in order to implement the Kemalist principles, 
thanks also to constitutional and legal provisions.25 The broad 
attitude of the Constitutional Court in defining, for example in 
relation to the Kurdish issue, the boundaries between what is 
cultural (i.e. nonpolitical) and what is political26 can be extended to 
                                                                                                             
 
European Comm’n, Turkey 2005 Progress Report 17, Sept. 11, 2005, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43956b6d4.html (Last visited 
November 24, 2011). In an advisory report on the functioning of Turkish 
judicial system, it has been noted that, “of course, it is one thing for judges and 
public prosecutors to say that they apply the ECHR in their decisions and for 
them to cite a selection of their judgments by way of example but that does not 
necessarily reflect the general situation or mean that the predominant mentality 
of the judiciary has changed.” European Comm’n, The Functioning of the 
Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit 132, July 
1119, 2004 (prepared by Paul Richmond & Kjell Björnberg); see also European 
Comm’n, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: 
Report of an Advisory Visit, Sept. 29–Oct. 10, 2003 (prepared by Paul Richmond 
& Kjell Björnberg). 
 24. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 309 (observing that changes in lower court’s 
jurisprudence can be the result of the influence of a plurality of actors—
government, public opinion, and civil organizations—rather than of a more 
supportive attitude towards human rights). 
 25. Even if the 2001 constitutional changes limited the grounds of 
admissibility of the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms, by 
eliminating a series of general clauses included in article 13 (“public order,” 
“general peace,” “public interest,” “public morality,” etc.), and introduced the 
principle of proportionality, such clauses reappeared in other articles concerning 
specific rights and freedoms (for example, art. 22 on freedom of 
communication) and judges have the last word in evaluating proportionality. 
 26. Shambayati & Kirdiş, supra note 7, at 776. It is worth noting that even 
judges and prosecutors who question the traditional pro-military predominance 
use the same political arguments. Thus, in relation to the Şemdinli incident, the 
prosecutor, indicting the trio who bombed the bookstore on charges of 
disrupting the unity of the state and undermining the integrity of the country 
(Article 302 of the Turkish Penal Code), made reference to political arguments, 
such as the fact that “the employment of illegal means in the war on terror 
undercut public confidence in the state and contributed to the goals of the PKK 
by undermining state authority, creating disorder, and crystallizing divisive 
ethnic identities,” or that, considering the conflict between elected politicians 
and appointed bureaucrats, “the elements in the TSK pursued a deliberate 
‘strategy of tension’ to preserve their prerogatives and block the reformist 
agenda of the AKP government.” It has been observed that this public 
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ordinary courts. In this regard, the example of article 301 of the 
new Penal Code introduced in 2005 and successively modified in 
2008 is meaningful.27 Despite a considerable decrease in 
                                                                                                             
 
prosecutor “had good connections with the government.” Tezcür, supra note 9, 
at 320. 
 27. The modified text of the Penal Code reads:  
1. A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic 
or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be sentenced 
a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three 
years. 2. A person who publicly denigrates the Government of 
the Republic of Turkey, the judicial bodies of the State, the 
military or security organizations, shall be sentenced to a 
penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years. 
3. Where denigrating of Turkishness is committed by a 
Turkish citizen in another country, the penalty to be imposed 
shall be increased by one third.4. Expressions of thought 
intended to criticize shall not constitute a crime.” The last 
paragraph is the most relevant innovation of the reform. 
According to Algan, “this statement had also been drafted to 
bring to law enforcement personnel’s attention that 
‘denigration’ should be demarcated from free expression.” 
Seen from this angle, it was an open warning directed to the 
public attorneys and to the judges. 
Bülent Algan, The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and 
the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey, 9 GER. L. REV 2081, 
2241 (2008).  Further on, the word “asağılamak” (to denigrate) replaces other 
terms meaning “to insult” (tahkir) and “to deride” (tezyif), used in the former 
version of article 159. For some authors, the old terms are more precise.  
The article has been modified again in 2008 in order to bring it in line with 
European standards:  
Denigrating the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish 
Republic, the Institutions and Organs of the State 1. A person 
who publicly denigrates Turkish Nation, the State of the 
Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 
the Government of the Republic of Turkey or the judicial 
bodies of the State, shall be sentenced a penalty of 
imprisonment for a term of six months and two years. 2. A 
person who publicly denigrates the military or security 
structures shall be punishable according to the first paragraph. 
3. Expressions of thought intended to criticize shall not 
constitute a crime. 4. The prosecution under this article shall 
be subject to the approval of the Minister of Justice. 
The introduction of the last paragraph is explained by the will to discourage any 
arbitrary use of the article by prosecutors. Id. at 2238.  
In the 2005 Regular Progress Report, the European Commission stated that: 
the abovementioned Article 301 cases raise serious concerns 
about the capacity of certain judges and prosecutors to make 
decisions in accordance with Article 10 ECHR and the 
relevant case law of the ECtHR. If the code continues to be 
interpreted in a restrictive manner, then it may need to be 
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indictments or convictions based on this article,28 which has been 
often used “as a political weapon of the judiciary against freedom 
of expression”29 thanks to the extremely general character of its 
provisions, judges and prosecutors showed a certain degree of 
resistance to normative changes through making reference to other 
unchanged provisions;30 in some cases they even continued to 
behave as if the provisions were unchanged. Thus, in 2006 the 
General Assemblies of the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals established highly restrictive 
jurisprudence on article 301.31 This decision highlighted the 
autonomy of the judiciary with respect to the legislative branch. 
In conclusion, despite the breaches in their jurisprudence, 
courts—and the Supreme Court in primis—hold a strongly 
conservative attitude in the most sensitive political cases, and 
judges and prosecutors still have broad discretionary power to limit 
fundamental rights and freedoms, while often using policy 
arguments in their decisions.32 
                                                                                                             
 
amended in order to safeguard freedom of expression in 
Turkey. In this context court proceedings based on Article 301 
will be closely monitored. 
Turkey 2005 Progress Report, supra note 23 at 26. 
 28. Id. at 17. 
 29. Algan supra note 27, at 2240, n.17.  
 30. It is the case of the provisions included in art. 169 of the Penal Code, 
concerning the support to illegal armed organizations, or in art. 288 on the 
prohibition of influencing a fair trial. European Comm’n, Turkey 2008 Progress 
Report 16, May 11, 2008, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf (Last visited 
October 24, 2011); see also European Comm’n, 2002 Regular Report on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession 21, Sept. 10, 2002, available at 
http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uyelik/progre02.pdf (Last visited December 13, 
2011);  2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession 30, 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_e
n.pdf (Last visited December 13, 2011). 
 31. On the basis of Article 301 of the new Penal Code, the Court confirmed 
a six-month suspended prison sentence for journalist Hrant Dink for insulting 
“Turkishness” in a series of articles he wrote on Armenian identity, European 
Comm’n, Turkey 2006 Progress Report 14, Aug. 11 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.p
df (Last visited December 13, 2011). 
     32. As an example, in October 2005 the Council of State rendered a 
decision sentencing a teacher wearing the headscarf on the way from home to 
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III. JUDICIAL TRAINING 
 
The conservative attitude of judges and prosecutors and the 
peculiarity of their legal reasoning questions the characteristics of 
judicial training, which plays an essential role in knowledge, 
practices and behavior transmission and socialization. As the 
judicial culture raises the issue of the proper implementation of the 
recent Euro-driven reforms, the European Commission has 
underlined the  
[i]mportance [of] sustained efforts . . . with respect 
to training judges [and] prosecutors,” as well as the 
fact that judges and prosecutors “are reminded by 
the responsible authorities about their duties and 
obligations to respect the relevant provisions 
stemming from International and European 
conventions in the area of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as required under Article 90 
of the Turkish Constitution.33 
The Turkish judicial training system falls within the typical 
continental model, hinging at the same time, at least since 1982, on 
                                                                                                             
 
school, while the law prohibited wearing headscarf only in public places (in this 
case, the school). Hootan Shambayati, Semi-Democratic/Authoritarian Regimes: 
The Judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian) Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE 
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 286, 297 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Tamir Moustafa eds., Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 33. Turkey 2005 Progress Report, supra note 23, at 17. In the European 
Commission’s eyes, this should be even more necessary in consideration of the 
corporatist character of some reform proposals raised by European Commission 
experts. See European Comm’n, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the 
Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit (July 11-19, 2005) (prepared by 
Paul Richmond & Kjell Björnberg). According to art. 90 of the Constitution, as 
amended on May 22, 2004, 
International agreements duly put into effect bear the force of 
law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court shall be made with 
regard to these agreements, on the grounds that they are 
unconstitutional. In the case of a conflict between international 
agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms 
duly put into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in 
provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international 
agreements shall prevail. 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY May 22, 2004, art. 90. 
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the above-mentioned “civilizing mission” of the judiciary. 
Therefore, the judicial training system resulted in a hybridism 
between the French (bureaucratic) idea of the judge as a “law 
technician” and the specifically Turkish tradition of the judge as 
“ideology guardian.” This system, allowing internal hierarchical 
and non-dialogical reproduction-transmission of knowledge and 
connection with the executive, was consistent with the “top-down 
attempt to enforce the ideas . . . and to inculcate the resulting 
cultural values and norms, that the military regime believed should 
direct state institutions as well as the individual lives of citizens.”34 
At the same time, such a hierarchical training system was an 
instrument to indirectly control the lower courts, because, as has 
been observed, “while the military may have strong informal 
influence over the high judiciary, the military’s ability to control 
the behavior of the lower court judges cannot be assumed.”35 It 
seems that the even consistent changes in the Turkish judicial 
training system have not radically modified this picture. This is 
clear if we look at the different elements constituting the notion of 
“judicial training system,” i.e. the structures making up the training 
process (i) and the training contents and methods (ii). 
 
A. Justice Academy 
 
Before the creation in 1987 of a School for Candidate 
Judges and Public Prosecutors under the control of the Minister of 
Justice, the training process was essentially managed on the one 
hand by the academic institutions,36 on the other by the judiciary 
itself. In this framework, courts constituted the main agents of 
                                                                                                             
 34. “The goal was to create a Liberal Turkish state and society along a 
French historical model of Liberalism.” Patricia J. Woods & Lisa Hilbink, 
Comparative Sources of Judicial Empowerment: Ideas and Interests, 62 POL. 
RES. Q. 745, 748 (2009). 
 35. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 311. It is worth noting that in France the 
creation of a judicial school after the Second World War was supported by 
lower judges and the Union fédérale de la magistrature (UFM), while the older 
judges “optaient plutôt pour la simple reproduction sans école et, plus 
globalement, les magistrats palcés en haut de la hiérarchie judiciaire, à la Cour 
de cassation, en tenaient pour le statu quo.” JEAN-PIERRE ROYER, HISTOIRE DE 
LA JUSTICE EN FRANCE, 876 (3d ed., Presses Universitaires de France, 2001). 
 36. These are under the supervision of the military through the Higher 
Education Board (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK). 
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socialization. The creation of the School during the liberal period 
of Turgut Özal slightly weakened the internal influence, because 
the training catalogues were under the control of the Education 
Department of the Ministry of Justice and the School as a whole 
was subordinated to the Ministry of Justice.37 Nevertheless, judges 
and prosecutors undertook two-thirds of the two-year period of 
vocational training in general courts and in the Supreme Court of 
Appeals (or the Council of State), which, therefore, still 
determined the form of the training. 
The creation of the Justice Academy in 2003—in view of 
the gradual compliance of the Turkish legal system to the 
European standards—did not bring about major substantial 
changes, apart from opting for a multi-professional training 
institution.38 On the one hand, dependence from the Ministry of 
justice has been confirmed, notwithstanding the mixed 
composition of the General Assembly of the Academy (which 
somehow minimizes the presence of representatives of the 
judiciary).39 This entailed some criticism by the highest 
                                                                                                             
 37. The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: 
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 44. 
 38. The Academy is also in charge of the training of administrative and 
military judges, lawyers, notaries. Regarding judges and prosecutors, the initial 
training path varies depending on the judicial career (ordinary, administrative, 
military). 
 39. The President of the Justice Academy is appointed by the Ministry of 
Justice from among three candidates proposed by the Board of Directors. The 
Board of Directors consists of a President, the General Director for Personnel 
from the Ministry of Justice and five members elected by the General Assembly. 
The General Assembly is composed of 27 members, eleven of whom depend on 
the executive power.  Of the remainder, five are members of the judiciary, five 
are academics from the universities, four are representatives of the Academy 
staff and two represent the other legal professions. In addition, three members 
appointed by the Ministry of Justice constitute the Board of Auditors. The 
Presidency of the Centre for the Training of Candidate Judges and Public 
Prosecutors, which is incorporated within the Academy once established, are 
appointed by the Ministry of Justice on proposal of the President of the 
Academy who, in turn, is appointed by the Ministry. See, The Functioning of the 
Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an Advisory Visit, supra 
note 33, at 45. The Ministry of Justice also influences recruitment. Graduates 
seeking entry to the judicial profession as either judges or prosecutors first take 
a written examination administered by the School Selection and Placement 
Centre, which administers all examinations for entry to higher education 
institutes in Turkey. Candidates who pass the written examination are 
interviewed by a panel composed of representatives of the Ministry of Justice, 
and successful candidates are admitted to the Judicial Academy for two years of 
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representatives of the judiciary against the law founding the 
Academy, as well as by important members of the Union of 
Turkish Bar Associations and of the Istanbul Bar Association.40 On 
the other hand, two-thirds of the training period continued to be 
held within the courts, including the Supreme Court of Appeals.41 
Therefore, notwithstanding the existence of an institution 
external to the judiciary, the current system reiterates forms of 
internal hierarchical dependence and knowledge reproduction. On 
the contrary, Turkey did not accept the suggestion of extending—
following the practice in the French training system—practical 
experience to extrajudicial institutions, such as bar associations or 
enterprises, as measures allowing the opening-up of the judiciary 
towards the civil society.42 In the same sense, the suggestion rising 
from the Council of Europe to include representatives of other 
legal professions and members of civil society in the teaching staff, 
which is now composed mainly of academicians and members of 
the higher courts, is not followed.43 In conclusion, referring to the 
Justice Academy as an autonomous institution—as the Turkish 
                                                                                                             
 
training. The oral examination enables the Ministry of Justice to exercise 
considerable influence over the recruitment of candidate judges and prosecutors. 
Id. at 19. 
 40. Id. at 27. 
 41. The training period for future ordinary judges lasts two years and 
includes two main phases. In the first, candidates follow a four-month 
preparatory training programme within the Academy and an eight-month stage 
within the so-called internship courts or prosecutor offices or ministerial 
departments. The second phase is characterized by a specific training 
(judge/prosecutor), also including a four-month training programme and an 
eight-month stage within different courts (including the Supreme Court of 
Appeals). 
 42. HAROLD ÉPINEUSE, ÉVALUATION DE LA FORMATION DES MAGISTRATS EN 
FRANCE ET EN EUROPE. BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES 20 (Institut des hautes études 
sur la justice., 2008). 
 43. CoE Lisbon Network, Questionnaire "A" on the structural and 
functional features of training institutions of judges and prosecutors. Turkey, 
available at 
www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/questionnaires/Turkey-reply-
A.pdf (Last visited December 13, 2011). Furthermore, faced with the necessity 
of integrating the judicial body in order to fulfill the many vacant posts, a law 
allowing for practicing lawyers to become judges or prosecutors was rejected. 
The many vacant posts have been filled every year through standard recruitment 
procedures, The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: 
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 58. 
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Minister of Justice does44—without taking into account the reality 
of the different internal and external influences on the training 
process could be misleading. 
 
B. Training Contents and Methods 
 
Concerning training contents and methods, three 
preliminary observations have to be made pertaining to the general 
situation of legal education in Turkey. The first is the lack of 
satisfactory legal education within universities, which has been 
highlighted by different reports as well as by judges themselves,45 
and the persistence of outdated teaching methods in initial training. 
The second is that training contents and methods owe much to the 
Roman law tradition, where the center of interest is not the student, 
but the law, and legal education aims at presenting a coherent 
system covered by general political principles which will enable 
the judge to understand and apply the law.46 This is common to 
other systems, like the Italian system, where, starting with 
university studies, teaching is essentially technical and theoretical 
and law and politics are seen as two completely distinct areas.47 
The third is that education and training are ideologically-oriented. 
Indeed, the military kept always in mind the importance of 
                                                                                                             
 44. See European Comm’n for the Efficiency of Justice, Scheme for 
Evaluating Judicial Systems 2007 (March 9, 2008) (prepared by Mert Harun & 
Turker Gökcen). 
 45. As the former President of the Supreme Court of Appeals stated,  
one of the most important conditions of improving the quality 
and reducing errors is to employ well-educated and competent 
jurists who are able to make sound interpretations and correct 
conclusions. Unfortunately, the ever-increasing Faculties of 
Law, which are only so in name, are rapidly corrupting law 
education. Unless radical measures are taken, this corruption 
will increase.  Professional ethics and the objectivity of judges 
are only possible through quality education. 
The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: Report of an 
Advisory Visit, supra note 33, at 100. In 2006, there were thirty Law Faculties in 
Turkey. 
 46. This applies also to the legal education in Law faculties. See Elliot E. 
Cheatham, Legal Education in Turkey: Some Thoughts on Education for 
Foreign Students, 2 J. LEGAL ED. 21, 23 (1949). 
 47. Shambayati, supra note 32, at 286. 
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training48 and, to mention some examples, it organized “special 
briefings for judges and prosecutors in 1997 to ensure that they 
shared the priorities of the TSK [the military] in its fight against 
the ‘internal enemies’ (i.e. Islamic political actors),”49 while law 
school curricula included until recently a course on the history and 
purposes of the revolutionary reforms in the fourth year.50 Yet, one 
could refer to the narrow notion of impartiality of judges that was 
outlined on occasion of the opening ceremony of the Justice 
Academy’s 2007-2008 academic year by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals, for whom judges must be partial to 
protect and sustain the Republic.51 
Avoiding any review of the courses held at the Justice 
Academy, I would like to point out one essential facet of the 
current situation, questioning if recent reforms have brought (or 
have the potential to bring) any change in Turkish judicial culture. 
I think the response should be twofold. It is unquestionable that the 
Ministry of Justice has suitably updated training catalogues in 
more sensitive areas in accordance with the convergence with 
European standards. The update concerned mainly EU law and 
human rights through ECHR provisions and ECtHR case law, 
consisting also in specific programmes aimed at training judges 
and public prosecutors as trainers. The overall impact of these 
                                                                                                             
 48. As highlighted by the creation in 1982 of the Higher Education Board 
and the statement that “it is natural that developments pertaining to the national 
education system, which is of vital importance for Turkey, are followed by the 
General Staff.” Id. at 289. 
 49. Tezcür, supra note 9, at 308. The briefing routine procedure involved 
also other component parts of the state and social structures, HAMIT 
BOZARSLAN, HISTOIRE DE LA TURQUIE CONTEMPORAINE 88 (La Découverte, 
2006). 
 50. Cheatham, supra note 46, at 22. 
 51. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals stated 
The main component of judgeship is impartiality. However, 
you will be partial in your decisions to protect and sustain the 
Republic of Turkey. If we are here today, it is because of the 
rights secured by our Republic. You should, and have to, 
know that the Republic form of government is the most 
appropriate regime suitable for human dignity and honor. You 
will be partial to claiming ownership of a democratic and 
secular system and the rule of law; you will be partial to 
owning our crescent and star flag, and to raising the flag even 
higher. You do not have the luxury of being impartial to these 
issues. 
Kemal Şahin, Impartiality of the Judiciary, 1 ANKARA B. REV. 16 (2008). 
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measures was deemed largely satisfactory by several lawyers’ 
associations, and it is also indirectly confirmed by some analysis of 
the courts’ jurisprudence. Certain attention was given to judicial 
ethics in relation to corruption phenomena, and foreign languages, 
although some concerns have been expressed on the quality and 
the extension of the relative courses.52 Specific ongoing training 
courses focused on law reforms, falling within ordinary legal 
adjournment. Moreover, several judges participated in exchange 
programmes, allowing the potential opening of the judicial body. 
In this regard, European convergence has then given noticeable 
results. 
Nevertheless, there is ground for more critical remarks in 
relation to other disciplinary areas. The training catalogues for the 
pre-service training are essentially oriented towards traditional law 
subjects and technical issues, with scarce or no attention to social 
sciences and comparative law as well as on subjects and learning 
methods aimed at developing a critical attitude in the judge, 
allowing the introjection of a culture of independence and 
pluralism and the making of what has been called a “thinking 
judge,” able to participate in European constitutional discourse.53 
In a word, no attention is given to what the European Judicial 
Training Network calls “Society Issues,” a catalogue including 
courses such as “The judge’s role and self-image today,” “The 
judge as arbiter of value,” “On the independence of the judiciary—
A European comparison,” and so on. Therefore, a better balance 
should be established between strictly technical issues and societal, 
constitutional and comparative subjects—more in general, what is 
                                                                                                             
 52. The Functioning of the Judicial System in the Republic of Turkey: 
Report of an Advisory Visit, supra note 23, at 96, 101. 
 53. Capeta, supra note 2, at 53, for which constitutional discourse “requires 
not only mechanical application of the principles learned, but also a critical 
assessment of them, either in relation to the internal legal order or as part of the 
European legal order.” Within the pre-service curriculum for ordinary judges 
there are six training catalogues. Two training catalogues concerns respectively 
“Professional Culture” and “General Culture and Personal Development;” the 
first one includes essentially technical subjects, while the second, which has a 
residual character, includes essentially courses related to personal abilities rather 
than general culture. A further catalogue focus on “Courses and Hobbies,” 
which includes, among others, courses on “Applied Turkish music,” “Folkloric 
dances,” “Traditional Turkish handicrafts” and “Foreign language.” 
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indicated as “complex curricula.”54 Further on, one could question 
the inclusion in Turkish training catalogues of subjects concerning 
Turkish national culture and the still scarce attention to foreign 
languages and other cultures. 
Lastly, training methods also reflect a traditional approach, 
similar to legal university education, where teaching methods are 
based on “lecturer centered system-conferencing courses” of a 
theoretical character, consisting mainly in memorizing legal 
principles and rules.55 Thus, not much attention is yet paid to 
suggestions coming from the European Commission on the need to 
integrate lectures and seminars with “methods allowing broader 
dissemination of the results of training.”56 While this problem is 
more serious concerning university legal education rather than 
judicial vocational training, nonetheless it still exists. 
In conclusion, we can look at the French judicial training 
system, which is generally used as a reference model for candidate 
countries, in particular in relation to training catalogues. The 
French system responds to three main objectives: acquisition of 
technical competence; understanding the social and economic 
milieu in which judges operate; and developing critical reflection 
                                                                                                             
 54. “The types of judicial education programmes that fall under “complex 
curricula” include those that suggest judges explore different dimensions to their 
role or explore their attitudes, values and beliefs. Judges’ learning style 
preferences generally mean these types of courses are more difficult to 
implement. Most judges’ learning preferences are for concise, logical analysis, 
abstract ideas, technical tasks and practical solutions. In contrast, complex 
curricula programmes (such as those designed to explore diversity or the social 
and cultural context to litigation) often do not fit these learning preferences,” 
Daniela Piana, Cheryl Thomas, Harold Epineuse, Carlo Guarnieri, Judicial 
Training & Education Assessment Tool. Meeting the Changing Training Needs 
of Judges in Europe, JUDICIAL STUDIES ALLIANCE 14 (2007). 
 55. A. Başözen, New Method in Turkish Legal Education: Internship 
During the Law Faculty, available at http://www.e-
akademi.org/incele.asp?konu=New%20Method%20in%20Turkish%20Legal%2
0Education:%20Internship%20During%20the%20Law%20Faculty&kimlik=127
1314793&url=makaleler/abasozen-3.htm (Last visited November 5, 2011). 
 56. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on judicial training in the European Union, COM/2006/0356 final, 
section 25, where it is added: “Moreover, the introduction of a multidisciplinary 
element in compliance with national traditions should facilitate exchanges of 
views and experience between, for example, judges, prosecutors, lawyers and 
police officers.” 
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on the judicial function.57 As I have briefly pointed out, the 
improvement of the Turkish judicial training system is essentially 
oriented towards the first objective. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen, changes in the Turkish judicial training 
system do not achieve a shift from a traditionally bureaucratic 
conception of judicial education to a pluralist one, where the “law 
is defined not by the letter of the law, but by its meaning,” drawing 
from interaction between multiple actors.58 European influence is 
limited to the introduction of training catalogues connected with 
contingent needs, such as human rights and EU law, but (still) does 
not affect the institutional framework, nor does it adapt judicial 
training contents and methods to social and political pluralism.59 
This situation has tangible effects on judicial culture. The 
above-mentioned analysis of courts’ jurisprudence and surveys of 
judicial ideology seem to confirm a certain resistance in opening-
up the judicial elite to social pluralism in order to allow the 
judiciary to act as an interface with civil society, due to the 
peculiarities of the Turkish socio-political system. The result is a 
                                                                                                             
 57. Questionnaire ''B'' on the role of training institutions in recruitment and 
initial training of judges and prosecutors. Council of Europe, Lisbon Network, 
available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/ 
questionnaires/France-reply-B.pdf. (Last visited October 24, 2011).  
     58. Sinisa Rodin, Discourse and Authority in European and Post-
Communist Legal Culture, 1 CROATIAN YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN L. AND POL’Y 
3 (University of Zagreb, 2005). 
    59. An indirect confirmation comes from the observation that Turkey is not 
an active player in international networks permitting broader socialization and 
the opening-up of the judiciary. B. van Delden, Effectiveness of the Judicial 
System. Report of a peer based assessment mission to Turkey, November 17-21, 
2008 (European Commission, 2008). This seems to confirm what has been 
observed by Daniela Piana in relation to Central and Eastern European recent 
accession Countries, i.e. that the adoption of any judicial training reform is 
highly dependent from the national actors which are involved. D. Piana, 
Unpacking Policy Transfer, Discovering Actors: The French Model of Judicial 
Education Between Enlargement and Judicial Cooperation in the EU, FRENCH 
POL. 5, 33-65 (2007). In fact, judicial training reforms in Turkey were 
essentially conducted by the Government through its Ministry of Justice and the 
High Judiciary, with scarce participation of lower court judges and judicial 
association, whose constitution has been authorized only in 2006. 
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judge who is still separate from society.60 The issue has been 
recently raised by Osman Can, co-chairman of the “Judges and 
Prosecutors Association for Democracy and Freedom.” According 
to Can, the Turkish judiciary should have a mental transformation, 
which passes also through an appropriate consideration of training 
needs. Thus, he suggests that “members of the judiciary should 
know about comparative political history and about non-
democratic movements and their implications for the world and 
also for Turkey.”61 The lack of a comprehensive training strategy 
aimed at effectively shaping independent judges through the ability 
to reason, taking into account normative and extra-normative 
elements, is also reflected in the type of legal argumentation used, 
characterized as authoritarian rather than authoritative legal 
discourse:62 thus, courts often refer to ECHR provisions or ECtHR 
case law simply as a mere support of their decision rather than as a 
reasoning instrument, excluding any constructive disagreement. In 
this regard, it has been observed that “Turkish courts very often 
pretend to consider the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, but then conclude that national laws and their interpretation 
                                                                                                             
 60. Interesting evidence is given by a columnist of the English language 
newspaper Today’s Zaman:  
Even for practical family matters, they [the judges] treated the 
people opposite them as just a part of problem. In the case in 
which I was a witness, after answering the judge’s questions, I 
tried to raise some points which had not occurred to him to ask 
and which were very important to the subject; however, he 
silenced me. In all three cases, instead of my own sentences, 
the judges asked the record keepers to write whatever they 
dictated on my behalf . . . I have heard several times that when 
candidates are chosen to be future judges, they are told they 
should keep their distance from ordinary people. They are 
asked not go to places everybody goes—they should not carry 
shopping bags, and they should not bargain when they buy 
apples. Of course, not only are they learning some manners, 
they are taught that they are the defenders of the republic, 
especially secularism. 
Ayse Karabat, A Face Like a Court(room) Wall, in TODAY’S ZAMAN, Feb. 21, 
2010. 
 61. Karabat, Taboo-Breaking Jurist Osman Can: Judiciary Cannot be 
Supra Political, in TODAY’S ZAMAN, Jan. 10, 2010. 
 62. M. Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental 
Transitions of the Central European Judiciaries, 1 EUR. PUB. L.  109 (2008). 
330 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 4 
 
 
 
of the present case is in full conformity with them.”63 That means a 
rhetorical use of ECHR provisions and ECtHR case law. 
The Turkish-European convergence, which I have 
considered through the lens of judicial training, is then generating 
changes in specific areas of legal knowledge, not in judicial 
mentality. This observation confirms what has been noted by some 
authors in relation to the Centre and East European former 
candidate and candidate Countries, concerning the ability of judges 
not only to refer in their decision to European law, but also to fully 
participate in the “constitutional discourse.” For these authors, 
European convergence brings about the former, but not the latter. 
As a consequence, major changes in legal education are needed 
and, “provided this transformation does not remain merely formal, 
but also brings changes in the curricula, syllabuses and methods of 
legal education, future . . .  judges will be prepared to participate in 
European constitutional discourse.”64 Regarding training 
structures, the path that has been sketched through the creation of 
the Justice Academy consists to a certain extent of the shift from 
judicial influence to the ministerial influence. Rather, a settling of 
the internal balance of the judicial training system involving a 
breach of the vertical/hierarchical logic, that is typical of any 
bureaucratic organization, would be more suitable. This new 
milieu could profit from the greater reactivity to opening-up 
towards civil society of the lower courts. 
 
                                                                                                             
 63. “In plain words, Turkish Courts should bring their understanding of 
freedom of expression in line with that of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Otherwise, no amendment of law will contribute to the protection of that 
freedom. The solution to the problem mainly depends on a change in mentality, 
not in the law.” B. Algan, supra note 27, at 2250. 
 64. Capeta, supra note 2, at 53. The task is not at all easy, by reason of the 
high number of judges and prosecutors—more than 9000—for a country of 
more than 75 million of inhabitants. 
